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Secure Remote Backups via rsync

# Filed on Oct 13, 2005 by Anthony 10 replies

The Problem: you want to back up an entire (Unix/Linux/BSD) system over the internet, and both the source and destination machines have dynamic IP addresses.

Mark I: rsync, using SSH for the transport, as a normal user

[dest]# rsync -av --delete user@source:/ /mnt/backup/

This doesn’t work because your normal user, user@source, will be unable to read some of the files on the source system, since they are readable only by root.

Mark II: rsync, using SSH for the transport, as root

[dest]# rsync -av --delete root@source:/ /mnt/backup/

If this works, then you are allowing root login over SSH on your source system, which is horribly insecure.

So a normal user account can’t read all the files we want to backup, but we don’t want to allow root to login over SSH...

Mark III: rsync, using the rsync server for the transport

If we use the rsync server (run "rsync --daemon") on the source system, we can run it as root and it can therefore read the entire filesystem.

/etc/rsyncd.conf on the source system:

uid = 0
gid = 0
path = /
transfer logging = no
read only = yes
hosts allow =

Now assuming that the destination system is

[dest]# rsync -av --delete source::wholefs/ /mnt/backup/

This is fairly secure because the rsync server is read-only, and because only can access it.  However it does require opening port 873 on the source’s firewall.

The problem is that the destination machine is on a dynamic internet connection so tomorrow its IP might be  We can use a DynDNS/ZoneEdit hostname and a client like Eponym to name our machines source.dyndns.org and dest.dyndns.org, and they’ll always point to the current IP; then set "hosts allow = dest.dyndns.org".  But the problem now is that rsync does a reverse lookup of the hostname’s IP to verify it; ideally it’d go dest.dyndns.org -> -> dest.dyndns.org, but in reality it goes dest.dyndns.org -> -> 1-2-3-4.foo.my-isp.com.  rsync (rightly) sees this as a potential security problem so it won’t allow access.

Mark IV: rsync, using the rsync server for the transport, tunnelled through SSH

Again, rsync server (run "rsync --daemon") on the source system, but "hosts allow" is now different:

/etc/rsyncd.conf on the source system:

uid = 0
gid = 0
path = /
transfer logging = no
read only = yes
hosts allow =

Now from the destination system, log into the source system via SSH as your normal user account, and create an SSH tunnel with the -L option:

[dest]$ ssh -L 8873:localhost:873 user@source

Now we have a secure encrypted tunnel from port 8873 on dest to port 873 (the rsync daemon port) on source.

[dest]# rsync -av --delete --port 8873 localhost::wholefs/ /mnt/backup/

This setup is very secure because the rsync server only accepts connections from the local system (, and because we don’t need to open port 873 in the source system’s firewall, since all the traffic is tunnelled through the SSH connection on port 22.

Final Notes

rsync can be run as a normal user on the client (dest) system, but in order to make an exact backup (preserving file permissions) it must be run as root.

In the rsync calls, I omitted any --exclude switches for the sake of brevity.  But in reality when backing up the root of a filesystem, you’ll probably want to:

--exclude /dev
(because device nodes are usually created dynamically)

--exclude /media
(exclude any USB memsticks, pendrives, etc)

--exclude /mnt
(exclude any mounted CDs, floppys, etc)

--exclude /proc
(because proc nodes are created dynamically)

--exclude /sys
(because sys nodes are usually created dynamically)

Please contact us with any questions or comments.


01. May 9, 2008 at 05:05pm by Jerret Kinsman:

Thank you very much for this post, it’s exactly what I was looking for!

02. Sep 16, 2008 at 03:57am by xaethos:

Excellent post!  You just saved me a great deal of time.  Now to write some scripts and crons.

03. May 14, 2010 at 03:09pm by Gerry:

Firstly fantastic article. I’ve read a lot of them on the topic of Rsync backups and this is by far the best I have found. Unfortunately I had to come to the solution of using the Rsync daemon to make everything read-only before I was able to track down your article in Google. Oh well. :)

However you say this:
"If this works, then you are allowing root login over SSH on your source system, which is horribly insecure."

I’m guessing what you’re saying here is that it’s bad because a compromise of the destination system would mean a compromise of the source system(s).

But the solution you give, while better still would allow anybody who had compromised the destination system to grab all of the private keys on the source system(s). I’m a linux system admin noob, but wouldn’t this situation be almost just as bad? At the very least doesn’t it mean that the attacker can pretend to be the source machine and connect to anything that it can connect to?

On another note, I discovered a "Mark II.V" while researching this topic. A number of sites recommend using ’sudo rsync’ along with a rsync sudoers restriction as a safer alternative to giving root access. However what they didn’t realise is that their sudoers restriction is meaningless because the user can just use ’sudo rsync’ to read and then overwrite their sudoers file. You may wish to add this to your fantastic article.

04. May 17, 2010 at 01:16pm by AnthonyDiSante:

Thanks for the comment, and the kind words!

Quoting Gerry:

However you say this:
"If this works, then you are allowing root login over SSH on your source system, which is horribly insecure."

Iím guessing what youíre saying here is that itís bad because a compromise of the destination system would mean a compromise of the source system(s).

I just mean that allowing remote root login, on any system, is a bad idea.  A typical brute-force attack needs to determine both a username and a matching password for the system under attack.  But "root" is a standard built-in username on Unix/Linux systems, so on systems with remote root login enabled, the attack is potentially far less difficult (and/or much faster).  And as a bonus, if the attacker does gain access, he now has root-level access (i.e. he fully owns the machine) instead of merely having user-level access.

05. Mar 5, 2013 at 08:55am by Tozz:

This design is very bad. With this setup you are giving away free root access to any user on your system.

/etc/rsyncd.conf is world-readable, so anyone could determine your "wholefs" block and start rsyncing everything from localhost.

This could happen by a user that has SSH access, login and then start rsync’ing from localhost. He could rsync your shadow file and start john the ripper. Basicly he can copy your entire filesystem and do whatever he likes.

It can also happen remotely by a badly protected website such as a compromised Joomla installation or an older version of phpMyAdmin.

Just because your rsyncd is read-only doesn’t make it safe. It only prohibits from writing files, but beeing able to read any file (includig password files) is just as insecure.

06. Mar 5, 2013 at 09:23pm by AnthonyDiSante:

Wrong.  The design is not bad at all.  It’s only bad if you take it out of context.  Most people don’t just let random other people have accounts on their PCs.  In fact, for most PCs, the only person with an account on the PC is the PC’s owner himself.  All of the potential risks that you mentioned are irrelevant in this most typical case.

07. Jun 5, 2013 at 04:32pm by jahvascriptmaniac:

Tozz is right, this technique gives full read access to the whole filesystem to anyone who has access to the source server.

This means normal users can read database passwords stored in php scripts owned by other users (therefore gaining read/write access to the victim’s database), for example, or like Tozz said copy and crack the shadow files.

You should only use this method if you 100% trust all users that may log-in on the machine (and if they mutually trust each other).

This should really be noted in the article, as a warning.

08. Jun 6, 2013 at 05:39pm by AnthonyDiSante:

As stated in the very first sentence of the article, the purpose of this guide is to backup an entire system over the internet.  This requires full read access, which is also clearly stated.  To add a "warning" like "warning: a person with full read access will have full read access" would just be silly.  If you allow untrusted users to have access to your system, then you have a whole additional set of concerns that aren’t relevant to the purpose of this article.

09. Mar 4, 2015 at 08:08am by GreenReaper:

The issue is that not just an intended user can achieve this access, but every user.

If every user was meant to have read-only access to every file on the system, there would be no need for the ’read’ flag in chmod.

Many automated backups involve a system which provides some kind of public service, which in turn is likely to have its own user account. Normally, this provides a level of protection. But even a chroot would not stop this as it uses a socket.

If you run a web server under its own account, and there is a flaw in the software it uses, through this setup a hacker can read every file on the system, giving them the ability to further increase their access. Normally they would not be able to do this.

Now, is a random hacker likely to figure out what you’ve done, and how to exploit it? Probably not; but the possibility is there. That is what we’re worried about.

10. Aug 7, 2015 at 07:41am by guidot:

rsyncd has built in password protection. Add this to your /etc/rsyncd.conf:

auth users = YourUserName
secrets file = /etc/rsyncd.secrets
strict modes = true
refuse options = delete

and create a file /etc/rsyncd.secrets with access to root only:

# touch /etc/rsyncd.secrets
# chmod 600 /etc/rsyncd.secrets

Put a single line in it like so:


Now restart the rsync daemon.

Any try to read files will now result in username and password prompts. So even if you have any users with local shell access they don’t have access to rsyncd.

man 5 rsyncd.conf
for details.

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